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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the twentieth century has seen an increase in societies
devastated and traumatized by mass violence. Traumatized societies develop
when severe inter-ethnic conflicts cause drastic shared losses, humiliation by the
enemy, and helplessness that prevents positive adaptation to the situation.' We
see examples of this resulting from the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, the
brutal militarism in Haiti, and the ongoing clashes between Palestinians and
Israelis in the Middle East. While many of these societies no longer appear
traumatized on the surface, these events may still affect societal processes.2
For more than 200 years, Haiti has suffered such traumas. Slavery and
colonization, a succession of predatory dictatorships, and economic sanctions
and international isolation continue to plague Haiti. In this post-Cold War
setting, the daunting challenge for conflict resolution scholars and practitioners,
government officials, and non-state actors is to develop multi-modal and
multidimensional mechanisms for dealing with failed states and traumatized
societies. This chapter will examine the effectiveness of social cubism as an
analytical framework for dealing with the multifaceted conflict in Haiti.
According to Byrne and Carter, studies of ethno-territorial politics typically
examine political and economic structures, to emphasize the competing interests
*
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of groups, or use a psychoanalytic approach to emphasize psychological and
cultural forces.' Byrne and Carter advocate the perspective of "social cubism,"
emphasizing the interaction of both the material and psychological mechanisms.
The social cube of conflict has six interrelated facets or forces: history; religion;
demographics; political institutions; economics; and psychocultural factors.4
Social cubism evokes images of the Rubic's Cube, which, if one twists or
turns the cube in any direction, that move will alter the interaction of various
elements of the game. These six social forces, when combined, produce
differing patterns of intergroup behavior or interaction. No one force can be
isolated to explain its relation to the other forces, nor can one stand alone as a
single cause of a conflict. For example, one dilemma for international policy
makers is that they do not have a scientific methodology for assessing the
cultural, political, and social meanings of trauma in the lives of civilian
populations and how these traumatic experiences alter the everyday lives of the
affected individuals. Little empirical research is conducted for assessing
outcomes, and humanitarian goals are often subordinated to political agendas.
Although the magnitude of such problems are becoming clearer, methods of
prevention and reconstruction of damaged societies have remained elusive.
Consequently, the enormous burden of human suffering and loss of social and
economic productivity remains hidden behind a veil of neglect, ignorance, and
denial.5
Social cubism offers an analytic framework for assessing the cultural,
political, and social meanings of trauma. I will use the six forces to examine the
state of Haiti today. Can this perspective shed new light on efforts to rebuild a
traumatized society in ways that promote economic development, civil society
reconstruction, justice, democracy, and human rights, and prevent a relapse into
new rounds of crisis and chaos? My contention is that neglecting the interaction
between these six forces, as well as the collective psychology of people
displaced from their homes and their country, along with the economic and
political reconstruction of the community, cannot support a lasting resolution.
Resolution of the ongoing political conflict in Haiti requires not only political
settlement, but also a wider healing of the traumatized society. Transformation
of this material and psychological anomaly requires short-term and long-term
efforts by many actors.
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Haiti is a country of extreme political polarization, class divisions, a
fractured national identity, and stark socioeconomic contrasts.6 Elites who
artificially perpetuate the extremes of the nation's colonial traditions have
proven unwilling to relinquish their status and wealth (and therefore power) in
post-independence Haiti. These divisions have exacerbated cultural rifts
manifested in language, religious practices, and attitudes toward skin color,
which can only impede7 the transition to democracy that the Haitian government
is now trying to effect.
Haiti has endured many horrendous events in its brief history. Perhaps the
perpetuation of these traumas down throughout its history, without the benefit
of healing as a nation, inhibits Haiti's development today. Volkan describes the
transgenerational transmission of trauma as
when an older person [or group] unconsciously externalizes his
traumatized self onto a developing child's [or group's identity]
personality. A child then becomes a reservoir for the unwanted,
troublesome parts of an older generation. Because the elders have
influences on a child [or community], the child absorbs their wishes
and expectations and is driven to act on them. It becomes the child's
task to mourn, to reverse the humiliation and feelings of helplessness
pertaining to the trauma of his forebears.'
Volkan uses the term "chosen trauma" to describe the collective memory
of a calamity that once befell a group's ancestors. It is, of course, more than a
simple recollection; it is a shared mental representation of the event, which
includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and
defenses against unacceptable thought.9 He maintains that the word "chosen"
fittingly reflects a large group unconsciously defining its identity by the
transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the memory of the
ancestors' trauma. I contend that Haiti as a country suffers from a
transgenerational transmission of trauma. I will use social cubism to analyze the
various social forces that interlock to produce the crisis in Haiti today.
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II. HAITI: AN OVERVIEW OF A TURBULENT HISTORY

Perhaps the single most important element to understand about
contemporary Haiti is that it remains the only nation in history to
have been founded by slaves who overthrew their masters ... This

unique aspect of Haitian history is both an asset and a liability.
Chetan Kumar
Haiti was the first country in the Caribbean to win its independence, when
the French were expelled in 1804, and only the second republic of the
hemisphere after the United States. Haiti, earlier known as Saint-Domingue,
shares roughly a third of the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican
Republic.'0 Modern Haitian history began in 1492, when Christopher Columbus
landed on Haiti near Cape Haitien on the north coast of Hispaniola. " The island
became an important colony and the seat of Spanish government in the New
World until Spain lost interest in Haiti because its obsession with gold had
exhausted that natural resource on the island.
Within fifty years of enslaving the island's inhabitants, half a million
Arawak.Indians had been exterminated in the Spanish gold mines. 2 The
genocide of the native Indians did not go unnoticed in Spain, however. The
missionary Bartolome de las Casas campaigned against Indian slavery,
achieving its abolition in 1542. Yet not only was the measure too late to prevent
the extinction of the Arawaks, but it also brought about the beginning of African
slavery in the New World.' 3 By 1517, Charles V authorized the export of
priest and King launched on
15,000 African slaves to San Domingo, and thus
14
the world the American slave trade and slavery.
After nearly one hundred years of Spanish, British, and French fighting
over the island, Spain ceded Saint Dominique, now Haiti, to the French in 1695
by the Treaty of Ryswick.' 5 By 1789 the French West Indian colony of San
Domingo supplied two-thirds of the overseas trade of France and was the
greatest individual market for the European slave trade. Slavery was an integral
part of the economic life of the age in the greatest colony in the world, the pride
10.
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of France and the envy of every other imperialist nation. The economic
structure rested wholly on the labor of half a million slaves. 6 San Domingo was
also noted for being the world's most repressive colony engendering a caste
system of French domination and set the stage for the social discord and
political exploitation that remains today. 7
Social discord between whites and black widened when the French slave
owners and their black female slaves produced a new class, the mulattos, also
known as gens de couleur or affranchis. This new class's social status rested
between those of whites and blacks. The plantation owners usually educated
their progeny and often signed over land titles to them, so in spite of
institutional discrimination against them, many mulattos became wealthy
landowners, establishing themselves as a viable class." Cruel and abusive racial
discrimination, however, was the hallmark of French colonization in this
three-tiered society of whites, mulattos, and blacks.
The modem nation of Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery
and colonialism beginning in 1791. In the fifty years or so leading to the 1791
slave revolution in Haiti, black slaves began to react to the brutal treatment of
their masters. The continuing racial strife, bolstered by the inspiration of the
French revolution, contributed to the outbreak of a revolution. During this
period of civil war, Toussaint L'Ouverture emerged as the dominant black
leader 9 of the first large-scale successful slavery revolt in the Americas.
L' Ouverture eventually gained command of the entire island. In 1802, however,
Napoleonic forces sent to depose L'Ouverture took him to France, where he
later died in prison. Nevertheless, Napoleon and his troops, having been
exhausted and defeated in Europe, finally conceded to the Haitian rebellion. 0
Haiti proclaimed independence on January 1, 1804. It emerged as a nation
under the successive leadership of two figures, Toussaint L'Ouverture and JeanJacques Dessalines. After two centuries of Spanish and French colonial rule,
and in the wake of the French revolution and a new government based on the
"Rights of Man," Haiti's slave population began to struggle for political rights
equal to those possessed by the island's white and mulatto elites. 2' The world's
first free black republic was therefore characterized by racial hatred and
corruption. The slave revolution virtually eliminated the white population and
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degenerated into a ten-year entanglement of atrocities known as the "War of the
Castes."2 2
After Dessalines's rule, the desperate competition between blacks and
mulattos manifested itself in the eventual division of Haiti; a northern kingdom
under black Henry Christopher (King Henry I of Haiti), who ruled harshly from
a Cape Haitian palace, and a southern republic under mulatto Alexandra
Petion's laissez-faire rule at Port-au-Prince.23 After Petion died in 1818, the
republican senate selected the commander of the Presidential Guard, General
Jean-Pierre Boyer, as the new president for life. President Boyer then invaded
San Domingo following its declaration of independence from Spain, with the
entire island controlled by Haiti until 1844.
Upon King Henry's death in 1820, Boyer was able to consolidate Haiti and
establish a government remarkable only for its relative stability over a
twenty-five year rule. After decades of Haiti's isolation from the international
community, France agreed to recognize Haitian independence in exchange for
a financial indemnity of 150 million francs. Most nations, including the United
States, shunned Haiti for almost forty years, fearful that its example could stir
unrest there and in other slaveholding countries. Over the next few decades
Haiti was forced to take out loans of seventy million francs to repay the
indemnity in hopes of gaining international recognition. Under Boyer, the
economy stagnated and the division between blacks and mulattos widened.
Boyer's rule gave way to a succession of twenty-two heads of state between
1843 and 1915, when the United States invaded Haiti.24
Since its first independence, Haiti's form of government has been,
practically speaking, a dictatorship. The main method of changing dictators has
been by coup, abetted by execution or exile. In 1915, United States Marines
invaded Haiti with an average force of 2000 to control the country. Although
legalistic reasons were given, the practical reasons were to protect United States
business interests and to keep Germany away (World War I had started and the
waters between Haiti and Cuba are the main ocean passage from the east to the
Panama Canal).
After twenty years of occupation, political stability, and some
improvements to Haiti's infrastructure, the United States withdrew. The United
States occupation had few lasting effects other than to reinforce racism between
the blacks and mulattos because the Marines granted mulattoes political power
over black Haitians. 25 In the absence of established political or social
institutions, the military remained the only cohesive institution in the country,
22.
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and the tool by which future governments would rule. Many Haitians refer to
the United States' withdrawal as Haiti's second independence.26
After several attempts in the late 1950s to move toward democratic
governance ultimately failed, military-controlled elections lead to victory for Dr.
Frangois Duvalier. The accession of the noiriste Duvalier, "Papa Doc" broke
with the tradition of the mulatto elite ruling the country but did nothing to
improve services that the state offered its citizens. In 1964, Papa Doc declared
himself President-for-Life and formed the infamous paramilitary force, the
Tontons Macoutes. Duvalier's regime was marked with terror and corruption,
as tens of thousands of Haitians were killed or exiled. The Duvalier reign of
terror finally fell apart twenty-nine years later, in February 1986, when his son,
Jean-Claude, was escorted into exile by the United States.27
In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic
priest, won sixty-seven percent of the vote in a presidential election that
international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in
February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and
was forced to leave the country in September of the same year. It is estimated
that between 300 and 500 Haitians were killed in the days following the
September coup, and 3000 in the following three years. The coup created a
large-scale exodus from the country; in fact, the United States Coast Guard
rescued a total of 41,342 Haitians from 1991 to 1992, more than the combined
number of rescued refugees from the previous ten years.28
The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the
military and the de facto government sanctioned repression, assassination,
torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's
condemnation. An American military intervention that restored Aristide to his
office in 1994 demonstrated once more that violence remained the decisive
element in Haitian politics; it represented the only viable means of ending
redictatorialization.29

The intervention, however, has had contradictory

consequences. While it resuscitated the difficult process of democratization and
facilitated the relative emasculation of the repressive organs of the state, it also
protected the old balance of class power and set out constraining parameters for
economic transformation. The result was a change of regime rather than the
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creation of a new state.3" In the November 1995 elections, Ren6 Preval,
formerly a minister in Aristide's administration, was elected in the second free
election in Haiti's history. Conditions in the country, however, remained
volatile over the next five years.
Aristide won his bid for re-election in November of 2000 with an
overwhelming ninety-two percent of the vote (although it is estimated that only
ten percent of the population participated in the election). The elections,
however, were plagued with controversy. Many of the major opposition parties
and six unknown candidates (too scared to participate) boycotted the election.3
Opponents accused Aristide of rigging the elections, inciting violence,
intimidating opponents, and even using bombings against political rivals. The
international community has yet to recognize the elections as legitimate. The
air of conflict contrasted with the public euphoria that accompanied the former
priest's election victory in 1990, when he became Haiti's first freely elected
president.
Haiti's past and present exemplifies a society traumatized by violence,
poverty, and a predatory state apparatus. If the country is to heal from its past,
it must dismantle the remnants of the predatory regime, replacing it with a
humane, democratic government that can respond to the needs of the nation.
Next, the interlocking relationship between history, demographics and the
political structure will be considered to better understand Haiti's psychocultural
trauma.

m.

DEMOGRAPHICS: THE LAY OF THE LAND

Haiti's only ties with its hemisphere are latitude and longitude. Think
rather of Haiti as a fragment of black Africa, a fragment dislodged
from the mother continent that drifted across the Atlantic and
grounded in the Antilles.
Heinl & Heinl
Approximately 700 miles southeast of Florida, Haiti shares a Caribbean
island with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is located between the islands of
Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The geographic proximity raises questions of
national security in the region, with Haiti as a democratic buffer, leaving Cuba
the only country in the hemisphere still under a dictatorship. The proximity of
Haiti to the United States has led to a large American expatriate community of

30.
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Haitian citizens and an influx of Haitians seeking political and economic
asylum.32
Demographic factors continue to be a wedge between the Haitian people
reminiscent of post-colonial Haiti. About ninety percent of all Haitians (noirs)
are ebony black. The remaining ten percent have varying traces of Caucasian
blood and are known as jaunes or muldtres. This racial division, Haitians call
it exactly that and speak of "the two races," is the most important fact of life in
Haiti. It dominates the country's whole existence. It is also, in the words of one
of Haiti's ablest thinkers, Alcius Charmant, "the supreme evil of our Republic,
the virus that ravages it, and the road to its ruin."33 Indeed, it is based upon
opposing ideologies concerning the form of government best suited to the
country.'
Two-thirds of Haiti's 7.5 million citizens live below the national poverty
level with an average annual income of less than $250, while a small group of
military and civilian elites continues to oppress the population. a Human
security in Haiti is dangerously weak, not only from a political standpoint, but
also more importantly from a health standpoint. The United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) reports that life expectancy at birth is only fiftysix years, compared with seventy-six in Costa Rica and the United States.36
Haiti has an overwhelmingly rural population with only thirty percent living in
urban areas.
The physical infrastructure of the cities has also decayed due to financial
constraints, which intensified from 1991 to 1994, swollen populations, and
environmental degradation. The Inter-American Development Bank reports that
less than forty percent of the water needs of the capital are being met and that
erratic gathering and disposal of solid waste in Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitien
contribute to deplorable sanitation conditions. Soil erosion and poor watershed
management damage roads and infrastructure in urban and rural Haiti.37
Haiti has the highest rate of illiteracy in the Western hemisphere and one
of the highest in the world. Roughly sixty-five percent of all Haitians are
illiterate. The other thirty-five percent, among whom a superbly educated elite
boasts degrees from the world's greatest universities, can read and write. 8
It is an old saying that Haiti is eighty percent Catholic and 100 percent
Voodoo (also written Vodun or Vodoun). This may not be the literal truth, but
32.
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33.
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it is doubtful whether more than fifteen percent of Haiti, including a small but
vigorous Protestant community, practices Christianity exclusively. As Judaism
had in Israel and Shinto in Japan, Vodun helped define the Haitian nationality
and ethos even though Roman Catholicism, in its French variant, remained the
official religion until 1987. 39
IV. THE PREDATORY STATE: POLMCAL STRUCTURES IN HAITI

The Haitian state has traditionally functioned as a parasitic
force, siphoning off economic resources from the peasantry through
draconian taxes and other means, and enforcing its will through a
multiplicity of controls, including the threat and the use of force.
Donald Schultz
During Haiti's history of governance by forty-two emperors, kings,
presidents, and other heads of state, all but three ended their term in office in a
bloody coup d'6tat, violent death, or exile.' In Haiti a deeply embedded culture
of predation has fostered autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and
economic stagnation. "It is in this sense that one speaks of the state versus
society, with the military operating as both a repressive arm of the government
and as a semiautonomous actor with interest of its own."'" As North and
Rotberg describe it, "the predatory state extracts income from constituents in the
interest of one group or class without regard to the impact on the wealth of the
society as a whole. Throughout the history of independent Haiti, the presidency
served as a source of private income for the rulers." ' 2 Characterized by few
productive expenditures or none, the state became, as Mats Lundahl comments:
at once too small and too big: too small in the sense that it has failed
to create a policy environment conducive to productivity and growth;
too large if one takes into account the number of public sector
employees who have been taken into the service of kleptocrats to
assist in the creation of private ruler income or have served solely as

Patrick Bellegard-Smith, ResistingFreedom: CulturalFactorsin Democracy;the Case ofHaiti,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 28 (Robert 1. Rothberg ed., Brookings
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39.
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recipients of public funds without performing duties other than
backing the ruler politically.4"
In this sense, Duvalierism was not an aberration but rather the culmination
of a particular set of historical experiences, including those provided by
traditional African culture, slavery, a bloody war of liberation, the reimposition
of elite dominance and mass submission, chronic cycles of tyranny and chaos,
and the effects of a prolonged United States occupation. The result has been the
development of an elaborate syndrome of destructive and self-destructive
political behavior marked by authoritarianism, paternalism, personalism,
patronage, nepotism, demagogy, corruption, cynicism, opportunism, racism,
incompetence, parasitism, rigidity, intolerance, rivalry, distrust, insecurity,
vengeance, intrigue, superstition, volatility, violence, paranoia, xenophobia,
exploitation, class hatred, institutional illegitimacy, mass apathy, aversion, and
submission."
The democratization of Haiti has been a slow and arduous process. The
decline in the predatory state began with the 1986 fall of the Jean-Claude "Baby
Doc" Duvalier dictatorship. Five different subsequent governments preceded
the internationally observed elections of December 1990, in which Aristide,
candidate of the Front National pour la Convergence Democratique (FNCD)
captured sixty-seven percent of the popular vote. The transition from
authoritarianism to populism was a function of the ascendancy of civil society.
The 1991 coup that followed suggests, however, that the old balance of class
power, as well as the vital repressive organs of the Duvalierist state, survived
the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and instigated the redictatorialization of
Haitian society.45

The coup represented yet another setback for the aspiration of ordinary
Haitians due to an American economic embargo instituted to oust the ruling
military regime. "The motivations for this intervention were ostensibly the
restoration of democracy and human rights, but there may have been an
underlying motive in that the stabilization of Haiti was the only politically
acceptable way to avoid a politically unacceptable influx of Haitian refugees
into the United States." 46
Either the return of a populist leader like Aristide or the stabilization
of military rule, was acceptable to the American government,
provided the refugee problem was 'handled,' even if handling meant

43.
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44.
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forcible repatriation, brutal means to discourage the outflow, and
resettlement in already overburdened countries in Central America
and the Caribbean.47

At the heart of the current Haitian national crisis is an incendiary conflict
between leadership groups inside and outside the government over the direction
of national politics generally, and economic reform specifically. Politically,
Haiti's leadership is torn between supporters of President Aristide and his
"Fanmi Lavalas" and supporters of the Lavalas Political Organization
(Organisation Politique Lavalas, OPL) led by Gerard Pierre Charles. Both
political parties grew out of the broad populist Lavalas movement originally led
by Aristide. OPL is now opposed to the Aristide's perceived influence over
Haitian politics and vaguely accuses him of having anti-democratic tendencies.
The first step toward democracy must be to dismantle the old state controls and
the public and private monopolies that formed the basis of the predatory state.4"
As long as these mechanisms are in place, regional security in the Caribbean
and the placement of refugees will remain a central issue.
Behind the values, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior that foster political
violence and a predatory state in Haiti are stark economic needs and
relationships. While the military-institutional bases of violence have been
destroyed, the economic substructure remains largely intact. The critical issues
here, both for democracy and political stability, are poverty, inequality,
economic growth, and class conflict.49
V. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: WILL IT EVER ADD UP?

Haiti's economic structure may be locked into a low-level
equilibrium that offers no easy way out ...even well-intended

governments with a purged, honest, bureaucracy have a Herculean
task in this respect.
Mats Lundahl
Haiti has long held the dubious distinction of being the Western
Hemisphere's poorest nation. In an economy with only a 9/10 percent per
capita annual growth between 1965 and 1980, -2 2/5 percent rate between 1980
and 1992,50 a thirty percent drop in GDP during the 1991 to 1994 military

47.
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period, and a 2 2/5 percent rate for 1999,5 1and the need for massive economic
reconstruction is starkly clear. About eighty percent of the population lives in
abject poverty. Nearly seventy percent of all Haitians depend on agriculture,
which consists mainly of small-scale subsistence 2farming and employs about
5
two-thirds of the economically active work force.
Haiti has yet to recover from the United States economic embargo
launched in 1993 to force out the government of Raoul Cedras. The embargo
devastated the nation's miserable economic base. During the three-year military
rule, conditions in all areas of Haitian life noticeably worsened. Infectious
diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis were rampant, with only forty percent
of the population having access to modern medicine. Free schools were
available to only ten percent of Haitian children. Deforestation and overfarming severely eroded the land, and the country of 7.5 million had one of the
highest population densities in the world. The economy shrank more than two
percent annually during the 1980s, then plummeted thirty percent during
military rule. Streets were pocked with craters, most prisons had no water or
electricity, and some judges were without pencils or paper.53 "The military
government was incompetent, corrupt, and violent with 3000-4000 deaths
attributed to state violence during that period. When Operation Restore
Democracy was initiated in the autumn of 1994, Haiti was an economic
wasteland."'
The embargo was a double-edged sword:
While the United Nation-sponsored action undoubtedly applied
pressure on the military junta running the country, the poorest
Haitians suffered its worst effects. Moreover, the negative
consequences of the embargo created a great many new challenges
for those seeking to help Haiti recover. United States assembly
companies that had been in Haiti, and then moved out at the request
of the United States government wanted recompense. Haitian
infrastructure deteriorated badly during the embargo and would cost
much more to repair. In short, the embargo, arguably useful in the
short-term to defeat the military regime, devastated Haiti
economically, making the longer-term United States objective of
restored growth much more complicated."
51.
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External aid is essential to Haiti's future economic development.
Comparisons of social and economic indicators show that Haiti has been falling
behind other low-income developing countries (particularly in the hemisphere)
since the 1980s. Haiti's economic stagnation is the result of earlier
inappropriate economic policies, political instability, a shortage of good arable
land, environmental deterioration, continued use of traditional technologies,
undercapitalization, migration of large portions of the skilled population, and
a weak national savings rate.56 Domestic and foreign private investment has
been slow to return to Haiti due to concerns about political conditions and
economic reform, even though international financial institutions and donor
agencies have committed substantial sums to assist Haiti in restoring and
expanding its physical infrastructure. High domestic interest rates and poorly
developed internal capital markets are other factors restraining economic
performance.57 Today, the military institution is gone but the oligarchy remains.
Prospects for economic development and a substantive improvement in living
conditions are problematic. The redistribution of economic power in favor of
the poor majority does not seem likely. Although Mintz has argued that hardly
any beneficial long-term political change can be accomplished without such a
redistribution, this is an explosive issue.5" More than any other single factor, the
threat of class warfare led to the coup that overthrew Aristide in September
1991. A resurrection of that specter would have repolarized Haiti, risked more
violence, and frightened away investors. Economic reconstruction is critical to
the continued expansion of democracy in Haiti. In addition to the economic and
political difficulties, however, a more difficult obstacle to democracy in Haiti
may be psychological and cultural influences. The tradition of a predatory,
oppressive state has left Haitians deeply distrustful of government and of
foreigners.
VI. PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS: CREATING A COHESIVE COMMUNITY
We're All in the Same Boat, and This Boat Isn't Going to Florida.
Jennifer McCoy

The history of Haiti is one of sharply opposed interests, starkly competing
visions of state and nation, and a rigid class structure. If "the Haitian mind" or
attitude is meant to signify the political, economic, and social positions of the
majority, Haitians have been of one attitude only twice in their history. Their
56.
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first coming together as a people was in the period 1791-1804, when they
bravely united against slavery and French colonialism. The second was in 1990,
when a majority of at least sixty-seven percent elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide
to the presidency in the country's first democratic and free elections. Events
since that election, however, reflect the deep divisions that developed in this
society between these two defining moments."
While pride in their historic accomplishment allows Haitians to think of
themselves as one nation despite the yawning social gulf that divides the top
from the bottom, this same pride also creates an inward focus that prevents
many Haitians from learning from others.' All Haitians sincerely consider
themselves members of the African race and claim bonds of brotherhood with
black Africans. Nevertheless, educated Haitians have always shared the
Europeans' paternalistic disparagement of things African.6 The fundamental
issue is how to create a sense among Haitians that they are all in the "same
boat," and that if one group or class goes overboard, the whole boat will sink.
The problem is that Haitian elites honestly believe, and have believed
for a century and a half, that they can survive without the poor, rural
majority of Haiti. Class structure, not merely income, and historical
tides, not simply the immediate past, are at the root of Haiti's modem
crisis. Indeed, a positive resolution of this crisis is impossible unless
these cultural and historical issues are understood and confronted.6"
The solution, Trouillot contended, involves a social contract between the
state and society, which lays out the obligations of each to the other. For Haiti,
as for most countries, the state preceded the nation at independence. But, unlike
other emerging democracies, the Haitian state did not achieve a social contract
that could produce a sense of national identity. Instead, in nineteenth century
Haiti, elites reacted to the rise of the peasantry not with a package of social
benefits that would have led the majority to believe that they were actually in
the same boat as the elites, but with a form of social apartheid. Elites have
believed that they could survive even if the majority did not. Thus, a sense of
sameness across class lines, a sense of nationhood, was never achieved in
Haiti.63
This cultural division among Haitians has created an internalized violence
in relation to the ethnic diversity of the population. Variation in skin color is
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perhaps the most "real" of the agents of cultural strife. There exists in Haiti a
historical tension between the older "mulatto" elites and the "black" middle
class. This is a complex issue, however, no aspect of Haitian history is more
confusing than the physical appearance of its people. Haiti is said to be divided
by color, but that is a gross simplification. It is closer to the truth to say that
consciousness of color varies between social classes and also within each class,
and that for many people light skin is symbolically important. But this
statement merely skims the surface. "The skin color of people must be seen as
part of a perceptual whole that includes hair type, nose type, lip type, eye color,
ear size and other features, such as amount of body and facial hair, and body
type."' As important as color is to Haitians, however, it is not clear that this
determined the identification that emerged of a ruling class, so much as did
education, military records, and personal connections. Thus, while color is a
significant cultural issue, it was not, at the birth of the nation, nor today, so
neatly a defining marker that social groups can safely be described in color
terms.
Similarly, variation in the use of language is one manifestation of cultural
division. All Haitians speak Haitian Creole to one degree or another. Eight to
ten percent of the population (the elites) speaks French well enough to claim
fluency, however, only a tiny minority within the elites is truly bilingual in both
French and Creole. More important than bilingualism is the messages given to
elite children that it is unacceptable for members of their class to speak Creole.65
Until Aristide's reinstatement to office, French was the official language in
schools and in the court systems. In this way, language is an effective social
barrier that denies majority participation in certain state institutions, thus ninety
percent of Haitians are excluded from power. Furthermore, there are subtle
nuances of meaning within Haitian Creole that illustrate cultural prejudices and
cynicism. For example, the word leta in Creole means both "the state" and
"bully." The urban people, in turn, refer to the rural peasants a mounn andewb,
which means "outsiders." '
Language manifests itself in the cultural divide as a tool of domination.
Whether one imagines hegemony to be relatively open or relatively closed, the
essence of the concept is not manipulation but legitimation. The ideas, values,
and experiences of dominant groups are validated in public discourse; those of
subordinate groups are not, though they may continue to thrive beyond the
boundaries of received opinion.67
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The very things that brought Haitians together are the very things that keep
them apart. Language and religion helped the Haitian peasants to face the
power deficit between master and slave, oppressor and oppressed, and a
dominant Europe and a subaltern Africa. In both Haitian language and Haitian
religion, one finds the necessary compromises and subterfuges that the weak use
to survive.
VII. RELIGION IN HAM: VOODOO OR CATHOLICISMMUST THERE BE A CHOICE?

It is often said that Vodun kept Haiti backward. Probably the reverse
is true: Vodun flourished because the rulers of Haiti denied their
multitudinous citizenry a chance to transform a socially and
economically stagnant rural life.
Robert Rotberg
Voodoo is deeply rooted in the Haitian culture; it is an amalgam of the
animist cults of West Africa infused with Catholic ritual. Voodoo plays a
central role in the life and history of Haiti, to disregard it is to foreclose serious
understanding of these people. Haitian Voodoo is the dominant system of
belief, therefore, an important national characteristic. The struggle between
Voodoo and the leading Christian faiths of Haiti (Roman Catholicism and, more
lately, Protestantism introduced by American missionaries) has been a constant
element in Haiti's social evolution.6"
Religious convictions and their representations divide Haitians culturally.
The elites proclaim their adherence to Christianity. Publicly, the elites associate
folk religion with evil, and successive Haitian governments have persecuted
many individuals who openly practice Vodun. Yet there is widespread evidence
that many of the elites themselves consistently practice aspects of it behind
closed doors. They thus claim for themselves a sense of cultural superiority
based on adherence to Christianity and rejection of Vodun (they have even
accepted the encouragement and support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the
persecution of Vodun believers), while continuing to practice Vodun
themselves.6 9

A large number of the peasants, too, claim to be Roman Catholic
Christians. Indeed, they practice it and follow the annual cycle of Roman
Catholic events, but they also refer to themselves as "servants of the gods,"
members of the major Haitian folk religion Vodoun, Vodun or Voodoo (these
68.
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terms will be used interchangeably). In Vodun, Catholicism is joined with
Haitianized African religions to form an integrated system of beliefs and rituals.
As one peasant put it, "one has to be a Catholic to serve the loa (Vodun
70
spirits)."
Vodun is as much political as it is religious. President Aristide was
conscious of both the symbol and reality of Voodoo when he took the oath of
office in Creole, and received the presidential sash from a mambo (female
priestess) in February 1991, with symbolic forms of greeting that resonated
deeply within the population. His deliberate use of Creole indicated a break and
discontinuity in cultural patterns that was strangely symbolic of the synthesis in
Vodun, and dealt blows to both the elite language (French) and elite religion
(Catholicism).7
Vodun has an exploitative side, however. Duvalier extended his control
over the Haitian population through the use of Voodoo and the Houngans (male
priests). Houngans had traditionally played an important role in the local
community and had in the past often, but unsystematically, been exploited for
political purposes by the Haitian governments, especially when elections had
been imminent, while after elections Voodoo was often outlawed.72
Duvalier made use of his knowledge of Voodoo and its influence over the
masses to establish a more solid and enduring relationship with its leaders.
Rotberg argues that because Voodoo presents a form of government in the rural
areas since the country does not, Voodoo will only be replaced by development;
Vodun is resilient. Without Duvalier, as without Soulouque, its links to the state
will fade away. Its small, secure, parochial base of power will remain until that
distant day when modernization, if it ever comes to innermost Haiti, erodes the
very foundations of a protective security-giving cognitive universe.73
Vodun became so closely associated with the Duvalier regime that once
Duvalier fled, many houngans and mambos were killed in the ensuing popular
uprising.74
VIII. CONCLUSION

Healing the trauma that Haitians have experienced over the last 200 years
is a herculean task. More importantly, the task is to understand that both the
material (economic and political) and psychological (psychocultural)
70.
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dimensions interact to maintain or mitigate conflict in a society. Social cubism
allows for the identification of various interrelated or interlocking social factors
and their detrimental affects on Haiti. These factors must be examined in light
of one another to initiate understanding of the conflict. Although the factors,
when combined, may produce different patterns of importance or urgency, it is
important not to allow one factor to overshadow the others just because it
appears more salient at the time. According to Byrne and Carter, the
interlocking nature of the cube also indicates that addressing only one
dimension is unlikely to provide a settlement, and yet improvements in a single
facet may ameliorate others as well.75
If historical circumstances do not allow a new generation to reverse
traditions of powerlessness. The mental representation of the shared calamity
still bonds members of the group together. But instead of raising the group's
self-esteem, the mental image of the events link people through a continuing
sense of powerlessness, as though members of the group existed under the large
tent of victimhood. 76 For Haitians as a society to emerge from this "tent of
victimhood," it is important to analyze the present dilemma using the social
cubism approach to intergroup conflict to account for how structural and
psychocultural mechanisms interact to exacerbate or ameliorate political
conflict, economic strife, and cultural divide that the country faces.
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